Whether Jawaharlal Nehru was “wrong” in signing the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in 1960 depends on the perspective and criteria used to evaluate the decision. The treaty, brokered by the World Bank, allocated the waters of the Indus River system between India and Pakistan. It gave India control over the eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas, Ravi) and Pakistan control over the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab), with certain restrictions on India’s use of the western rivers for non-consumptive purposes like hydropower. Here’s a balanced look at the arguments:

Arguments Suggesting Nehru Was “Wrong”

1. Concession of Strategic Resources: Critics argue that India, as the upper riparian state, gave up too much control over the western rivers, which constitute about 80% of the Indus system’s water flow. This limited India’s ability to fully utilize these rivers for irrigation, hydropower, or strategic leverage, especially in Jammu and Kashmir.
2. Long-Term Constraints: The treaty restricts India’s ability to build storage dams or significantly alter the flow of the western rivers, which some see as a handicap for addressing modern challenges like climate change, population growth, and energy needs. For example, India can only build run-of-the-river projects on the western rivers, which are less efficient for water storage.
3. Security Concerns: Given the perennial tensions with Pakistan, some critics believe Nehru was naive to sign a treaty that limits India’s ability to use water as a geopolitical tool. They argue that water could have been leveraged to pressure Pakistan, especially in times of conflict.
4. Domestic Political Backlash: In India, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir, there has been resentment over the treaty. Locals argue it restricts the region’s development potential, as India cannot fully exploit the Chenab and Jhelum rivers for power or agriculture.

Arguments Supporting Nehru’s Decision

1. Diplomatic Necessity: At the time, India and Pakistan were recovering from the 1947 partition and war. The treaty was seen as a way to de-escalate tensions over a critical shared resource. Nehru prioritized regional stability, and the treaty was a rare example of cooperation between the two nations.
2. International Pressure and Reputation: The World Bank played a significant role in mediating the treaty, and signing it bolstered India’s image as a responsible global player committed to international norms. Rejecting the treaty could have strained India’s relations with global institutions.
3. Fair Allocation: While Pakistan got the larger share of water volume, India received unrestricted control over the eastern rivers, which were sufficient for its immediate agricultural needs in Punjab and Haryana. The treaty was seen as a balanced compromise, given Pakistan’s greater dependence on the Indus system.
4. Durability of the Treaty: The IWT has survived three wars (1965, 1971, 1999) and numerous crises, proving its resilience. This suggests Nehru’s decision to formalize water-sharing helped prevent conflicts over water, which could have escalated tensions further.
5. Economic Focus: Nehru’s government prioritized rapid industrialization and agricultural self-sufficiency. The eastern rivers provided enough water for India’s Green Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, suggesting the treaty did not significantly hinder India’s development at the time.

Contextual Considerations

• Historical Context: In the 1950s, India’s technical and financial capacity to build large dams or storage projects was limited. The restrictions on the western rivers were less significant then, as India lacked the infrastructure to exploit them fully.
• Pakistan’s Dependence: Pakistan’s economy and agriculture were heavily reliant on the Indus system, particularly the western rivers. Denying Pakistan access could have led to economic collapse or war, which India wanted to avoid.
• Modern Relevance: Critics today often judge the treaty through a contemporary lens, ignoring the geopolitical realities of 1960. However, some of the treaty’s limitations have become more apparent with India’s growing energy and water needs.

Conclusion

Nehru’s decision to sign the Indus Waters Treaty was a pragmatic choice given the geopolitical, economic, and diplomatic context of the time. It ensured stability, avoided immediate conflict, and aligned with India’s broader foreign policy goals. However, from a modern perspective, the treaty’s restrictions on India’s use of the western rivers can seem overly concessionary, especially given India’s growing needs and ongoing tensions with Pakistan. Whether this makes Nehru “wrong” depends on whether you prioritize short-term diplomatic gains and stability (where the treaty succeeded) or long-term strategic flexibility (where it has limitations).